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Leahy: Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law
by James E. Leahy*
This was an eventful year in the field of constitutional law.
The court upheld the right of individuals to distribute antiwar literature within a railway station, struck down an injunction prohibiting county employees from peaceful picketing, upheld an ordinance punishing conduct which urges a
riot or which urges others to commit acts of force or violence,
and held the California loyalty oath unconstitutional.
A public transit district which permits commercial ads in its
motor buses must now accept ads designed to influence public
opinion on political, social, and economic matters.
The right to remain anonymous while expressing one's views
was extended to include recorded telephone messages, and a
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political party's newspaper was held exempt from a newspaper
licensing tax.
Pandering is not part of the definition of obscenity in California, so said the supreme court.
"Good moral character" was said to be too vague a standard
for the licensing of theaters, but this raises the question of
whether it is also too vague as a standard for determining
who may receive a license to practice an occupation or profession.
The right to wear a beard was denied a high school student
based on a finding that benefits to the public outweigh the
infringement upon that right.
Resort to the equal protection clause proved futile, and it
appears that the appellate courts in California have rendered
it about as dead as the United States Supreme Court has
rendered the privileges and immunities clause.
Many other constitutional issues were before the courts in
the past year. Some of these are reviewed in this article, but
others not considered as important have been omitted.
First Amendment
Expression-Related Activities
Although the First Amendment protects against "abridging
the freedom of speech," the protection afforded by that amendment is not limited to verbal expressions. Many activities may
be expression-related to such a degree as to be entitled to
First Amendment protection. Among the kinds of activities
which fall into this category are the distribution of printed
material/ peaceful picketing,2 parading,3 demonstrating,4
sitting in,5 soliciting,S and the providing of group legal services. 7
1. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1939).
2. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
3. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133
A.L.R. 1396 (1941).
256
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4. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
13 L.Ed.2d 471, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965).
5. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
15 L.Ed.2d 637, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966).
6. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313, 2 L.Ed.2d 302, 78 S.Ct. 277
(1958).
7. United Mine Workers v. Illinois
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In summing up its approach to these expression-related
activity cases, the United States Supreme Court in the recent
case of United States v. O'Brien 8 set forth its general approach
to the question this way:
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech"
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the
quality of the governmental interest which must appear,
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms:
compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interests; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 9
The appellate courts of California were presented with
several expression-related activity cases this past year. The
supreme court confronted the problem first in the case of In re
Hoffman. 10 In this case petitioners were convicted of violating
a Los Angeles ordinance that restricted the right to be in a
railway station. l l The petitioners entered the Los Angeles
State Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d
426, 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967); Brotherhood
of Railway Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 89, 84 S.Ct. 1113,
11 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1964).
8. 391 U.S. 367, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 88
S.Ct. 1673 (1968). Hereafter the term
"Supreme Court" will be used to refer
to the United States Supreme Court.
9. 391 U.S. at 372, 20 L.Ed.2d at
679-680, 88 S.Ct. at 1678-79.
17
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10. 67 Cal.2d 845, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97,
434 P.2d 353 (1967).
11. Los Angeles Municipal Code
421.11.1: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to loaf or loiter in any waiting room, lobby . . . of any railway
station . . . airport or bus depot
. . . or to remain in any such station,
airport, or depot . . . for a period
of time longer than reasonably necessary to transact such business as such
person may have to transact with any
CAL LAW 1969
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Union Station and began to distribute leaflets protesting the
Vietnam war. They did not interfere with the free flow of
traffic nor with other persons in the station. The police were
called and, after determining that the petitioners were engaged
in activities prohibited by the ordinance, they were asked to
leave. When they refused to do so, petitioners were arrested,
charged with a violation of the ordinance, and found guilty.
In challenging the constitutionality of the conviction the
court pointed out that First Amendment activities can be regulated on streets and in parks only upon a showing of "a valid
municipal interest that cannot be protected by different or
more narrow means. »12 Even then the regulations are limited
"to the extent necessary to prevent interference with the municipality's interest in protecting the public health, safety, or
order or in assuring the efficient and orderly use of the streets
and parks for their primary purposes."lS Although O'Brien
had not yet been decided, it appears that the test used by the
California Supreme Court contains the same basic criteria as
the United States Supreme Court's statement in that case, when
referring to expression-related activities upon public property.
The station in HofJman, however, was private property open
to the public upon the general invitation of the owner. The
court hurdled this problem by pointing out that the rule with
regard to such activities on streets and in parks applied even
though the street was in a privately owned town. The court
cited Marsh v. Alabama14 wherein the Supreme Court had
reversed a conviction of an individual for distributing religious
literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town contrary
to regulations of the town management.
It seems dubious that either Marsh, or its companion case
Tucker v. Texas 15 (where the town was owned by the United
States), provide authority for extending the rule referred to

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/12

common carrier using . . . such
station, airport, or depot, . .."
12. 67 Cal.2d at 849, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 99, 434 P.2d at 355.
13. 67 Cal.2d at 849, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 99, 434 P.2d at 355.
258
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14. 326 U.S. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66
S.Ct.276 (1946).
15. 326 U.S. 517, 90 L.Ed. 274, 66
S.Ct. 274 (1946).

4

Leahy: Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law

above to private property which has been opened to the public
for business purposes. In Marsh there was a town with
streets, sidewalks and stores, just like any other municipality,
although completely company-owned. In Marsh the curtailing
of First Amendment activities on the streets of Chicksaw, Alabama, not only would have deprived the distributee of his
right to express his views, but also would have deprived the
citizens thereof of the liberties guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments for no justifiable reason.
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free
citizens of their State and country. Just as all other
citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare
of community and nation. To act as good citizens they
must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored. 16
It is clear that if those wishing to distribute literature

could not do so upon the streets of Chicksaw, Alabama, then
their right to be heard, and the right of the citizens of the
town to hear, would have been seriously curtailed. The same
cannot be said of the situation at Union Station from the viewpoint of either those desiring to express their views or of the
potential recipients of those views. The streets around the
station were certainly open to those desiring to distribute their
materiaP7 and the patrons of the railway could have been contacted as they arrived at or left the station.
If the rule which applies to public places is to apply to
the inside of a railway station, it would seem appropriate to
ask to what other areas of privately owned property does the
rule apply? Would the same rule apply to an airport, to a
department store, or to a hotel lobby?
In Hoffman the court used as a test whether or not the
16. 326 u.s. at 508, 90 L.Ed. at 269270, 66 S.Ct. at 279.
17. In a footnote to this case the
court cites Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939)
for the proposition that expression can·
not be abridged by simply saying that
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it may be exercised at some other place.
In Schneider, however, the choice was
not between a public place and private
property, but was a case in which ex·
pression·related activities were pro·
hibited in certain public places and per·
mitted at others.
CAL LAW 1969
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conduct interfered with the use of the premises as a railway
station.
Similarly in the present case, the test is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether
it interfered with that use. IS (Emphasis added.)

In arriving at this test the court referred to Brown v. Louisiana I9 wherein the Supreme Court struck down a conviction
under a breach of peace statute for sitting in at a public
library. In Brown the facts indicated that the defendants did
not interfere with the use of the library nor were they disorderly or noisy. The library, however, was a public facility.
Further, the defendants were protesting because they were
barred from using it because of their race. They were petitioning the government, which operated the library, to discontinue its illegal segregation policy. This is quite different
from the petitioners' situation insofar as the railway station
was concerned. They were not barred from the station, nor
discriminated against by the owner or by the city in its use.
If interference with use is to be the test, it would seem to
follow that non-interference with the use of any private facility
which is open to the public would permit the same kind of expression-related activities which the court says were permissible in the station.
Since the Hoffman decision the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza. 20 In this case the
court upheld the right to peacefully picket upon a privately
owned shopping center which was open to the general public.
In a case decided prior to Logan Valley Plaza, the California
Supreme Court had reached the same result. 1
These cases can be distinguished from Hoffman in that in
the case of a shopping center there is factually a situation
18. 67 Cal.2d at 851, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 100, 434 P.2d at 356.
19. 383 U.S. 131, 15 L.Ed.2d 637,
86 S.C!. 719 (1966).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/12

20. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603,
88 S.C!. 1601 (1968).
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1. Schwartz-Torrance
Investment
Corp. v. Baker & Confectionery Workers Union, Local 31, 61 Cal.2d 766, 40
Cal. Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921 (1964),
cert. den. 380 U.S. 906, 13 L.Ed.2d 794,
85 S.C!. 888.
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very similar to a company-owned town, as in Marsh. There
are streets, sidewalks, and stores, and in some shopping centers,
areas for rest and relaxation similar to parks. Further, one
need only visit a modern-day shopping center to ask, if the
employees cannot picket their employers upon the sidewalks
and streets within the center, where can they picket? In
many of today's shopping centers the right to picket would be
nonexistent if picketing were prohibited therein because generally there are no public sidewalks or streets upon which to
effectively picket.
Freedom of expression must be protected. There is a great
deal of difference, however, in expressing one's opinion in
those areas traditionally open for that purpose and private
property (open to the public) not traditionally used as places
for expression. Confining expression-related activities to those
areas traditionally open for such purposes2 is adequate protection for expression-related activities on some private property, such as shopping centers, because they are like traditional
public areas. The right of the actors to act, and the potential
hearers to hear, would be seriously curtailed if such activities
were prohibited on such property. A railway station (and
other related private areas) is not an area where expression
of this type is traditionally carried on. There are generally
sidewalks and streets which can be used with little curtailment
of the expression-related activities. The interests of the individual, the government, and the private owner are thus
protected.
A second expression-related activity case was presented to
the supreme court in In re Berry.3 In this case the court held
invalid an injunction issued in connection with a strike of
county welfare workers, which prohibited:
( 4) picketing or causing picketing, or "causing, participating in or inducing others to participate in any demonstration or demonstrations" on any grounds or street or
2. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 87 S.Ct. 242
(1966).
3. 68 Cal.2d 137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273,
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436 P.2d 273 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see York, REMEDIES, and Grodin, LABOR RELATIONS, in
this volume.
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sidewalk adjoining grounds owned or possessed by the
County on which structures are located which are occupied by county employees or in which such employees
"are assigned to work.,,4
Before taking up the question of the constitutionality of
the injunction the court pointed out that "[i]n this state it
is clearly the law that the violation of an order in excess of the
jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt.
."5 The court added further that a
court order violating a citizen's constitutional rights is void
for lack of jurisdiction in the court to issue it. 6
The real issue involved here was whether the injunction was
unconstitutional. The court held:
[T]his order is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it
improperly restricts the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms, and further that it is too vague and uncertain
to satisfy the requirements of notice and fair trial which
are inherent in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7
The test to be used in such cases, the court stated, quoting
from Thornhill is:
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion [i.e. peaceful picketing] can be justified only where the clear danger
of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording
no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition
for acceptance in the market of public opinion. s
4. 68 Ca1.2d at 151, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 282-283, 436 P.2d at 282-283.
5. 68 Cal.2d at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 280, 436 P.2d at 280.
6. The court distinguished Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 18
L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824 (1967) by
concluding that what the United States
Supreme Court held in that case was
that the Alabama rule of law requiring
resort to legal channels to contest the
CAL LAW 1969
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validity of a court order affecting first
amendment freedoms, rather than disobey it and then contest the validity did
not constitute an intrusion upon such
freedoms. The rule in California is
that an order void upon its face cannot
support a contempt judgment.
7. 68 Cal.2d at 151, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 283, 436 P.2d 283.
8. 68 Ca1.2d at 153, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 284, 436 P.2d at 284.
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On this basis the court concluded that "[t]he County has fallen
far short of demonstrating a compelling public interest sufficient to justify limitation of informational picketing and demonstration per se in the locations where the order forbids
such activities."9
The court also concluded that in directing the order not only
at the Union but also at other persons acting with them
and the inclusion in the order of the phrase" , in concert among
themselves' [there was injected] into the description a baffling
element of uncertainty as to the application of the order"lo
which made it vague and uncertain under the due process
clause.
The Berry case is significant not only because of its basic
conclusion that this order was unconstitutional and as such
could not support a contempt judgment; it is also significant
because the court made no distinction as to the status of the
petitioners who were private citizens and those petitioners to
whom the order was primarily directed-the welfare workers.
Thus under this decision public employees were accorded the
same constitutional protection as private citizens.l1
The constitutionality of a statute punishing expression-related conduct was before the supreme court in People v.
Davis. 12 The statute punishes one who engages in conduct
which urges a riot or urges others to commit acts of force or
violence. The record of the case did not contain evidence of
the kind of conduct or what "urging" the defendant had engaged in. The only question before the court was whether the
statute was unconstitutional on its face. The statute refers
to both acts or conduct which urge a riot, and to the mere
"urging" of others to commit acts of force or violence. Concentrating on the second part, the court noted that what was
being punished here was the urging of others to commit acts

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

9. 68 Cal.2d at 154, 65 Cal. Rptr. at
284, 436 P.2d at 284.

servant, 4 Cal. Western L. Rev. 1, 12
(1968).

10. 68 Cal.2d at 156, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 286, 436 P.2d at 286.
11. See Leahy, The public employee
and the first amendment-Must he
sacrifice his civil rights to be a civil

12. 68 Cal.2d 481, 67 Cal Rptr. 547,
439 P.2d 651 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this
volume.
CAL LAW 1969
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of violence, etc., which could be punished under the decision
in Feiner v . New York .13 This case, the court argued, is distinguishable from Terminiello v. Chicago 14 in which the
Supreme Court overturned a conviction of one who had been
found guilty under jury instructions which permitted a finding
of guilt if the defendant's "speech stirred people to anger,
incited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. "16
To persons of ordinary understanding, the urging of
others to acts of force or violence or to burn or destroy
property, as proscribed by section 404.6, is neither similar
nor comparable to speech which merely stirs to anger,
invites public dispute, or brings about a condition of
unrest. 16
As long ago as 1939, in Cantwell v. Connecticut/7 and as
recently as 1968, in Carroll v. President and Commissioners of
Princess Anne,ts the court has asserted that freedom to speak
does not sanction "incitement to riot,,19 and on that principle
alone the statute should be constitutional. Although not discussed by the court, the statute seems even more limited than
the Cantwell concept because the statute also requires the
showing of intent on the part of the accused and evidence that
at the time and place there existed circumstances which produced a clear, present, and immediate danger. 2o
In another expression-related activity case, the court of
appeal, fifth district, upheld a conviction under a trespass
statute a refusal to leave a public building when it was regularly closed to the pUblic. The case is Parrish v. Municipal
13. 340 U.S. 315, 95 L.Ed. 295, 71
S.C!. 303 (1951).
14. 337 U.S. 1, 93 L.Ed. 1131, 69
S.C!. 894 (1949).
15. 337 U.S. at 5, 93 L.Ed. at 1135,
69 S.C!. at 896.
16. 68 Cal.2d at 485, 67 Cal. Rptr.
at 549, 439 P.2d at 653.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/12

17. 310 U.S. 296, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60
S.Ct. 900. 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1939).
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18. - U.S. - , 21 L.Ed.2d 325, 89
S.C!. 347 (1968).
19. - U.S. at -,21 L.Ed.2d at 331,
89 S.C!. at 351.
20. For a discussion of the part the
intent of the speaker should play in determining whether the speech should be
prohibited see Note: Freedom of
speech and assembly: The problem of
the hostile audience, 49 Col. L. Rev.
1118. 1123 (1949).
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Court, Modesto Judicial District. 1 This was in line with the
statement in Adderley v. Florida 2 to the effect that "[n]othing

in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from
even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute.
"3

Although this statute was upheld as against an attack that
it was unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 the writer is of the opinion
that because it predicates violation upon "the surrounding
circumstances . . . [being] such as to indicate to a reasonable man that such person has no apparent lawful business to
pursue,"5 the statute is vague and uncertain from the point of
view of the individual who must determine whether or not he
is in violation of it. In determining whether he is in violation
if he stays in the building, he must determine whether a reason·
able man (not himself) would determine whether he (the individual) has a lawful reason for being there. This is asking
too much of any individual.
Loyalty Oaths Must Be Narrowly Drawn

Loyalty oaths, and in particular the oath required by Section
3 of Article XX of the California Constitution, received
judicial scrutiny during this past year in the case of Vogel v.
County of Los Angeles. 6 This oath requires public employees
to swear that they will support and defend the United States
and California Constitutions. It also requires the affiant to
swear or affirm that he is not a member, nor within the past
five years has he been a member, of any organization that
advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence, and that he will not advocate nor become a member of
any such organization.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

1. 258 Cal. App.2d 497, 65 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE, in this volume.

3. 385 U.S. at 47, 17 L.Ed.2d at 156,
87 S.Ct. at 247.
4. See In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d
34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966).

2. 385 U.S. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 87
S.Ct. 242 (1966).

5. Cal. Penal Code § 602(n).
6. 68 Cal.2d 18, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409,
434 P.2d 961 (1967).
CAL LAW 1969
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In approaching the question the court noted that a similar
oath was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 1952.7
This was in accordance with the previous United States
Supreme Court case of Adler v. Board of Education of the City
of New York. B But said the California court:
Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
however, have established constitutional doctrines not
recognized in Adler, and the holding in that case has
since been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
(Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 595, 87
S Ct 675, 17 LEd 2d 629,636.)9
In determining that the oath was unconstitutional, the court
relied upon what are now generally accepted constitutional
concepts: ( 1) that although there is no constitutional right
to public employment, "the government may not condition
public employment
upon any terms that it may
choose to impose.
.;" (2) that when the government
conditions public employment by limiting an individual's constitutional rights, "it bears the heavy burden of demonstrating
the practical necessity for the limitation . . .;" and (3) in
the area of First Amendment freedoms such limitations "must
be drawn with narrow specificity."lo
In requiring narrow specificity, the Supreme Court has
been concerned with the effect such statutes would have upon
the First Amendment right of freedom of association. In
Elfbrandt v. Russell,Il the court pointed out that:
Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens
or as public employees. 12
7. Packman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d
676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952), app. dismd.
345 U.S. 962, 97 L.Ed. 1381, 73 S.C!.
951.
8. 342 U.S. 485, 96 L.Ed. 517, 72
S.C!. 380, 27 A.L.R.2d 472 (1952).
9. 68 Cal.2d at 21, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
411, 434 P.2d at 963.
266
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10. 68 Cal.2d at 22, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
411, 434 P.2d at 963.
11. 384 U.s. 11, 16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86
S.C!. 1238 (1966).
12. 384 U.S. at 17, 16 L.Ed.2d at
325, 86 S.ct. at 1241.
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It follows that a law which applies to "membership without

'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization
infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. ,,13
The California oath clearly violates this standard. This
section of the Constitution "proscribes membership, past,
present, or future, in any party or organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by force, violence
. . . and [t]here is no provision requiring a specific intent
to further the unlawful aims of the organization.,,14
Justice McComb's dissent in the Vogel case, to a great
extent, is the adoption verbatim of most of the opinions in
three prior cases: Steiner v. Derby,t5 Garner v. Board of
Public Works/ 6 and Garner v. Board of Public Works.17 Justice McComb also quotes Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in
Key ish ian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New
York.ls

After Elfbrandt and Key ish ian the California decisions in
Steiner and Garner are of doubtful validity. As for the Supreme Court decision in Garner, one can argue that it too
would not survive judicial scrutiny today. The approach used
by the court in Elfbrandt if applied to Garner would have
brought about a different result. 19
Justice McComb concluded his dissent with the following
statement:
In my opinion, the judiciary should not disregard the law
as laid down by the citizens of California, directly or
throught their representives in the state legislature. 2o
One wonders what Justice McComb means by this statement. Does he mean that when the people or the legislature
13. 384 U.S. at 19, 17 L.Ed.2d at
326, 86 S.Ct. at 1242.
14. 68 Cal.2d at 24, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
413, 434 P.2d at 965.
15. 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d
429 (1948), cert. dismd. 338 U.S. 327,
94 L.Ed. 144, 70 S.Ct. 161.
16. 98 Cal. App.2d 493, 220 P.2d
958 (1950), affd. 341 U.S. 716, 95 L.Ed.
1317, 71 S.Ct. 909.

17. 341 U.S. 716, 95 L.Ed. 1317,71
S.Ct. 909 (1951).
18. 385 U.S. 589, 17 L.Ed.2d 629,
87 S.Ct. 675 (1967).
19. See Leahy, Loyalty and the first
amendment-A concept emerges, 43 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 53 (1966).
20. 68 Cal.2d at 51, 64 Cal. Rptr at
430, 434 P.2d at 982.
CAL LAW 1969
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make laws the judiciary should never declare them unconstitutional? Surely he can't mean that. The power of the
judiciary to measure duly enacted laws against constitutional
mandates was settled long ago in the case of Marbury v.
Madison. l
Use of Sound Amplification Devices May Be Limited

Ordinances regulating the use of sound amplification devices
are part and parcel of many municipal codes. One such ordinance was before the court of appeal of the fifth district in the
case of Chavez v. Municipal Court of Visalia Judicial District. 2
The court in attacking the ordinance acknowledged that the
public does not have unrestricted right to use public highways
and that the county can make reasonable restrictions with regard to such use.
This ordinance, however, "presents great opportunity for
discrimination, political preference and the type of censorship
which is repugnant to the very concept upon which our free
form of government is founded."s
There is nothing unusual about this case. It follows prior
Supreme Court doctrine with regard to conditioning First
Amendment rights on the granting of permits. The court does
point out, however, that another court of appeal, the fourth
district, had held in a 1953 case4 that an almost identical
ordinance was constitutional.
The fifth district refused to follow the fourth district because "the paramount public interest wihch is inextricably
connected with the subject matter of the ordinance has impelled us to reconsider the question in light of conditions which
have prevailed in this nation during more recent years."5
The California Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal
from the Chavez decision, two justices dissenting. In view
of the fact that there undoubtedly are some sound device ordi1. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
2. 256 Cal. App.2d 149, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 76 (1967).
3. 256 Cal. App.2d at 157, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 81.
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4. Haggerty v. County of Kings, 117
Cal. App.2d 470, 256 P.2d 393 (1953).
5. 256 Cal. App.2d at 157, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 82.
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to the one involved here still in effect in some
municipalities, a resolution of the matter would have eliminated the uncertainty that now exists as to whether a county
may enforce a similarly drawn ordinance.

Free Speech and Advertising on Public-Operated Motor
Coaches

Maya public transit district restrict the use of advertising
space upon its motor coaches to commercial messages offering
goods and services for sale? The California Supreme Court
answered this unusual question in the negative in the case of
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District:6
We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum
for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for
advertisements on its buses, cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertisements
expressing opinions and beliefs within the ambit of First
Amendment protection. 7
In reaching this conclusion the court equated advertising
upon buses to the use of public buildings to hold public meetings. In the case of Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
District,S the court struck down a statute which granted the
use of public facilities for meetings of organizations formed
for education and related purposes but "prohibited the granting of the privilege to those who constitute a 'subversive element,' as that term was broadly defined in the statute."g
In Danskin the court could see the heavy hand of the censor
denying the use of the facilities to those with whom the censor
disagreed. The same kind of censorship, however, is not
involved in the transit district's choice to accept only commercially oriented advertisements or political ads at election
time. The court recognized this but was of the opinion that
6. 68 Cal.2d 51, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430.
434 P.2d 982 (1967).
7. 68 Ca1.2d at 55, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
433, 434 P.2d at 985.
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8. 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885
(1946).
9. 68 Ca1.2d at 55, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
433, 434 P.2d at 985.
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the prohibition was painted with a broader brush than that
condemned in Danskin. From this the court concluded that:
The vice is not that the district has preferred one point
of view over another, but that it chooses between classes
of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, sanctioning
the expression of only those selected, and banning all
others. Thus the district's regulation exercises a most
pervasive form of censorship.lO

Just what the court referred to here is not clear, unless
the court meant that there were three classes of ideas seeking
public attention: (1) commercial ads; (2) political ads at
election time; and (3) public opinion ads such as those plaintiffs offered. l l Because commercial ads are not entitled to
constitutional protection, the phrase "chooses between classes
of ideas entitled to constitutional protection" cannot mean
those ads. 12 The classes of ideas to which the court then
referred must be those in classes 2 and 3. What the court
said is that the district cannot make a choice between those
two classifications because this is "a most pervasive form of
censorship.,,13 The court did not rest its decision on this
alone. After pointing out that commercial ads are not entitled to First Amendment protection, the court noted that
in this case the district had chosen to give such messages preference over nonmercantile ads. This, too, is censorship according to Justice Black's concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana,14 wherein he asserted that a statute which prohibited
"obstruction of public passageways," but did not apply to
10. 68 Cal.2d at 56, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 434, 434 P.2d at 986.
11. The ad which the plaintiffs desired to display on the buses read as
follows: "'Mankind must put an end
to war or war will put an end to mankind.' President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate
Vietnam.
Women for Peace
P. O. Box 944, Berkeley."
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12. Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316
U.S. 52, 86 L.Ed. 1262, 62 S.Ct. 920
(1942).
13. 68 Cal.2d at 56, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
434, 434 P.2d at 986.
14. 379 U.S. 536, 13 L.Ed.2d 471,
85 S.Ct. 453 (1965).
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labor organizational activity was "censorship in a most odious
form . . . ."15
While one may agree that this is in effect a form of censorship, there is not in it the same evil as in Danskin. There the
school had the power to choose between conflicting viewpoints on religious, political, social, and economic matters.
It had the power to promote those views with which it agreed
and to deter those with which it did not. The district in
W irta is not making that kind of choice. During election time
it does just the opposite. It seeks out the opposing candidates
and proponents and opponents of ballot propositions and
offers advertising space to them. The district argued that
this was really an equal protection question and that its regulation was valid because its classification of ads rests upon a
rational basis. The court did not accept this argument because
it could not find any societal interest which would be enhanced by the classification.
Despite efforts of the district to articulate a rationale for
its policy, if there is a societal interest, other than free
speech, requiring protection here, it is too obscure or
trival to be readily apparent. 16
The court then went on to point out that the test of reasonableness which is applicable to due process and equal protection is not a test used to determine whether governmental
action infringes upon First Amendment rights. The test in
cases such as this is the clear and present danger test and
there was no clear and present danger here.
Wirta is a difficult case. At the outset it is agreed that the
district need not have offered any of its space for advertising.
Until it did so there could be no claim of infringement upon
constitutional rights. When it did open its space to certain
classes of ads, did this give rise to a First Amendment right
in the plaintiffs? The majority said that it did, whereas three
dissenting Justices, Burke, McComb and Schauer, disagreed.
Once one crosses the threshold of giving the plaintiffs a
15. 379 U.S. at 581, 13 L.Ed.2d at
502, 85 S.Ct. at 470.
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16. 68 Cal.2d at 59-60, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 436, 434 P.2d at 988.
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First Amendment right to use such space the regulation appears clearly unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional under
the clear and present danger test because as the court noted,
there is no clear and present danger of the occurrence of
any substantive evil by the acceptance of such ads. I7 A balancing test does not save the regulation either because here
again, whatever societal interest there may be in not accepting
such ads, it is obscure in this case. IS Assuming that the
district can make some regulations with regard to the ads it
accepts as to size and shape, etc., the present regulation would
also fall because of overbreadth. It bans all public opinion
ads and thus absolutely annuls the First Amendment right
which the majority held arose when the district opened its
space for advertising. I9
Anonymity and the Recorded Telephone Message
That anonymity plays a part in the protection of constitutional rights is now well established. The United States
Supreme Court has held that anonymity of affiliation is indispensible to the protection of freedom of association. 20 In
Talley v. California/ the court held that freedom of speech
also included the right to remain anonymous while exercising
that right.
In the case of Huntley v. Public Utilities Commission,2 the
court was called upon to determine whether the right to remain
anonymous was applicable to recorded telephone messages.
At issue was a regulation of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company which required all subscribers to its recorded an17. Dennis v. United States,
U.S. 494, 95 L.Ed. 1137,71 S.C!.
(1951); Schenck v. United States,
U.S. at 47, 63 L.Ed. 470, 39 S.Ct.
(1919).

341
857
249
247

18. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif.,
366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, 81 S.C!.
997 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U. S. 109,3 L.Ed.2d 1115, 79 S.C!.
1081 (1959).
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19. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
20. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80 S.Ct. 412
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163
(1958).
1. 362 U.S. 60, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, 80
S.Ct. 536 (1960).
2. 69 Cal.2d 67, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605.
442 P.2d 685 (1968).
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nouncement service to include in their recorded messages
their names and addresses. Huntley subscribed to this service,
under the slogan "Let Freedom Ring," to air his views on
certain political matters. Because he did not wish to give
his name or address, he sought a review of an order of the
Public Utilities Commission which had approved the Pacific
Telephone regulation.
In striking down the regulation as a violation of freedom
of speech, the court discussed such cases as NAACP v. Alabama3 and Bates v. City of Little Rock,4 wherein the Supreme
Court had struck down state attempts to force disclosure of
membership in the NAACP. The court used a balancing test
in those cases, balancing the infringement upon free association
against an alleged interest of the government in requiring disclosure of such membership.
The California Supreme Court also likened Huntley to
Talley, supra, a case wherein the United States Supreme Court
had struck down an ordinance which prohibited distribution
of handbills that did not contain the name and address of
the person producing or distributing it. Talley, and the line
of cases it follows,5 are not balancing cases. The Talley
opinion is written by Justice Black, who is no friend of balancing. 6 While Justice Black cites with approval NAACP
and Bates, it appears that his real attack on the ordinance in
Talley is that it is too broad:
Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false
advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance is in no manner
so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative
history indicating such a purpose. Therefore we do not
3. 357 U.S. 449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78
S.Ct. 1163 (1958).
4. 361 U.S. 516, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80
S.Ct. 412 (1960).
5. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.Ed.
18
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1423, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed.
949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1939).
6. See Justice Black's dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S.
at 56, 6 L.Ed.2d at 120, 81 S.Ct. at
1010 (1961).
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pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent
these or any other supposed evils. 7
Huntley is a mixture of balancing and overbreadth. The
court did not find a "compelling state interest" which would
tip the scales in favor of the regulation. Even if there were
interests that need protection, such as an indication that the
message is not sponsored by Pacific Telephone, such a disclaimer could have been required without identifying the
actual sponsor of the message.
It appears to the writer that the balancing test does not
adequately protect the anonymity that is necessary for the
exercise of free expression in cases such as this. Balancing
can result in requiring full disclosure which to some people
might be a complete deterrent. 8 Approaching the problem
from the viewpoint that a narrowly drawn regulation might
be permissible would require the maker of the regulation to
seek out ways to accommodate the public interest without
deterring potential speakers. If it were impossible to draft
the regulation without it having such a deterring eifect, the
regulation should not be allowed to stand unless there is a
clear and present danger that the anonymous speech would
result in a substantive evil which the government has a right
to prevent. 9
Speech Versus Unobstructed Justice

The exercise of one's right to free speech clashed with
the public's interest in having unobstructed justice in the case
of Crosswhite v. Municipal Court of Eureka Judicial District.lO
Just prior to the trial of two individuals for violating a "bed
tax" ordinance, Crosswhite placed ads in local newspapers
calling attention to the case and asking why the city had to
have such a tax when many cities in California did not.
7. 362 U.S. at 64, 4 L.Ed.2d at 562,
80 S.Ct. at 538.
8. See Canon v. Justice Court, 61
Cal.2d 446, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 393
P.2d 428 (1964).
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9. See: Comment: The constitutional
right to anonymity: Free speech, disclosure and the devil, 70 Yale L. Jour.
1084, 112R (1961).

10. 260 Cal. App.2d 428, 67 Cal.
Rptr 216 (1968).
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When the ads were brought to the attention of the court,
it postponed the trial and commenced contempt proceedings
against Crosswhite. After finding that the ads constituted a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice, the
court found him guilty. A petition for a writ of review to
the superior court was denied and an appeal to the court of
appeal, first district, was taken. That court reversed and
sent the case back to the superior court for review. In so
doing the court reviewed the Supreme Court cases which
have touched upon the question and concluded correctly that
the test that should apply is whether there was a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice by the exercise
of the right of free speech. Although the court sent the case
back to the superior court to resolve the issue, it is clear that
the appellate court did not believe that there was a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil in this case.

Freedom of the Press and the Licensing of Newspapers
The application of a business license tax to a newspaper
published by a political party was before the court of appeal,
fourth district, in the case of Long v. City of Anaheim.l1 The
newspaper in question was published by the Socialist Labor
Party and was used to promote nominees of the party and to
disseminate the party's political philosophy. It carried no
commercial advertising but was sold on newsstands for five
cents a copy. Not being successful in securing an exemption
from the license taxes of the cities of Anaheim and Garden
Grove, the petitioners brought an action to enjoin those cities
from requiring the payment of the tax. The Anaheim ordinance contained an exemption for charitable and non-profit
organizations, while the Garden Grove ordinance defined
"business" that was subject to the tax as one "carried on for
profit or lifelihood [sic]. "12
Upon examining the facts, the court found that the paper
in question had always operated at a loss and that the limited
amount of revenue obtained by the sale of the paper only
11. 255 Cal. App.2d 191, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (1967).
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12. 255 Cal. App.2d at 196, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 59.
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reduced the annual deficit. Further, the court noted that in
the case of Murdock v. Commissioner of Pennsylvania13 the
Supreme Court had held that selling religious literature did
not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise.
In the instant case, "the primary function of the 'Weekly
People' is to present the views of the Socialist Party to the
paper's subscribers and not to realize a pecuniary profit.,,14
On this basis the court held that the paper was "a noncommercial nonprofit, purely political publication, and that under
any reasonable interpretation of the . . . ordinances, the
publication
(is) exempt from the payment of the
business license fee. ,,15 The court stated that if the paper
was not entitled to the exemption the ordinances would probably be unconstitutional because "[iJf the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to be preserved,
municipalities should not be free to raise general revenue by
taxes on the circulation of information and opinion in noncommercial causes. . . ."16
Freedom of the Press and the Distribution of a Newspaper

The city of Pacific Grove, California, has an ordinance
that prohibits the throwing of newspapers or other printed
matter on any residential property without the consent of
the owner. In the case of Di Lorenzo v. City of Pacific
Grove/ 7 the publisher of a local newspaper sought to enjoin
the enforcement of this ordinance, claiming that it violated
her First Amendment right of freedom of the press. Recognizing that the right of freedom of the press includes protection
for the means of dissemination, the court held that "the proper
test of regulation
in this area turns upon whether
,,18
the regulation is a reasonable and necessary one.
13. 319 U.S. 105, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 63
S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 81 (1943).
14. 255 Cal. App.2d at 198-199, 63
Cal. Rptr. at 61.
15. 255 Cal. App.2d at 199, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 61.

17. 260 Cal. App.2d 68, 67 Cal. Rptr.
3 (1968). For further discussion of this
case, see McKinstry, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT.
18. 260 Cal. App.2d at 71, 67 Cal.
Rptr. at 5.

16. 255 Cal. App.2d at 200, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 62.
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that
the ordinance
was reasonable and narrowly
drawn, the court held that it was constitutional.
If one considers that what is being regulated is the means
of effectively pursuing one's rights, in this case freedom of
the press, the court's use of the test of reasonableness appears
to be valid. The Supreme Court itself has not only upheld
"reasonable" regulations aimed at the means of exercising a
rightI9 but has upheld reasonable regulations upon the exercise
of the right itself.20 Even in those cases where the court has
struck down a regulation as a violation of a right, it has
declared that some reasonable regulation of the right is acceptable. 1

Pandering Is Not Part of Obscenity Definition in California
The definition of obscenity and its application to a specific
publication was before the California Supreme Court in People
v. NorofJ.2 The defendants were charged with possession of
obscene matter for distribution in this state. The issue was
whether the magazine in question was obscene per se under
the statutory definition.3 The court held that it was not.
The case is noteworthy in that the state argued that the
trial court should have permitted the jury to hear evidence
bearing upon defendant's "pandering" of the magazine. The
19. Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 95 L.Ed. 1233, 71 S.Ct.
920, 35 A.L.R.2d 335 (1951); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L.Ed. 513,
69 S.Ct. 448, 10 A.L.R.2d 608 (1949).
20. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 97 L.Ed. 1105, 73 S.Ct. 760,
30 A.L.R.2d 987 (1953); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L.Ed.
645, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 85 L.Ed.
1049, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396
(1941).

1. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 63 S.Ct. 862
(1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
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U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666
(1939).
2. 67 Cal.2d 791, 63 Cal. Aptr. 575,
433 P.2d 479 (1967).
3. Cal. Penal Code § 311 (a) reads as
follows:
"Obscene" means that to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the predominant appeal of
the matter, taken as a whole, is to
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters
and is matter which is utterly without
redeeming social importance,
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defendant with pandering and even if it had, pandering is
not a crime in California. 4
In discussing the matter of pandering the court disapproved
of some statements made in Landau v. Fording. 5 In that
case the court of appeal had referred to, the fact that the
movie in question had earned substantial sums of money from
its exhibition and that fact bolstered its conclusion that the
movie was obscene. As a basis for this it used the rationale
of Ginzburg v. United States,6 wherein the Supreme Court
held that evidence of pandering may be used to determine
whether the material in question is obscene.
The trial court in the N oroff case seemed to be of the opinion that the Landau decision added the pandering factor to
the California definition, but the court of appeal rejected this
VIew.
Ordinance Licensing Theaters Must Contain Precise
Standards

Section 103.109 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code provides that no person shall engage in the business of exhibiting
motion picture films without a written permit from the board
of police commissioners. The Code also provides that the
board shall not issue a license if the operation of the theater
will not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience,
good morals, and general welfare of the public; or if the
business has been or is a public nuisance; or if the applicant
is unfit to be trusted with the privileges granted by such
permit, or has a bad moral character, intemperate habits or
bad reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.
In Burton v. Municipal Court defendants, charged with the
4. Pandering is the business of purveying sexual matter openly advertised
to appeal to the erotic interest of the
customer.
5. 245 Cal. App.2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1966), aff'd mem., 388 U.S. 456,
18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 87 S.Ct. 2109 (1967).
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See discussion of this case Cal Law
Trends and Developments 1967, pages
346-349.
6. 383 U.S. 463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86
S.Ct. 942 (1966).
7. 68 Cal.2d. 684,68 Cal. Rptr. 721,
441 P.2d 281 (1968).

24

Law
violationLeahy:
of Constitutional
the ordinance,
sought a declaration that these
sections of the Code were unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the petitioners argued that the requirement of a license infringed upon their
right of free expression, the court had little difficulty disposing
of that question:
No credible authority supports an exemption for motion
picture theaters from the requirement of obtaining a
license pursuant to a city's police power to regulate
theaters, and a substantial number of decisions have
upheld such authority and the exaction of a license fee. s

The next question that the court had to answer was more
difficult: Did the standards by which the board was to act
violate any constitutional requirement? The court's answer
was in the affirmative. The Code did "not provide precise
standards capable of objective measurement-the sensitive
tools to be employed whenever First Amendment rights are
involved."9 The court equated the exhibition of motion pictures with the exercise of such First Amendment rights as
solicitation and the distribution of non-commercial printed
material. Statutes licensing these activities have been held
unconstitutional where the laws give the licensing authority
discretionary power under vague standards governing the issuing of the license.
It is this equation that makes this an unusual case. What
the court said is that when a license is required to engage
in a business that embodies the exercise of a constitutional
right, the licensing statute must be narrowly drawn. This is
so because "overly broad standards are fraught with the hazard
that an applicant will be denied his rights to free speech and
press through exercise of the power of the board, in its discretion, to refuse a permit because of the content of the films
which the applicant exhibits in his theater. "10
8. 68 Cal.2d at 689, 68 Cal. Rptr. at
724, 441 P.2d at 284. See also AMusEMENTS AND EXHIBITIONS, 4 Am. JUf.2d
150.

9. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr.
at 726, 441 P.2d at 286.
10. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr.
at 726, 441 P.2d at 286.
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

279

25

l.:onslitutional Law
Cal Law Trends
and Developments,
1969,the
Iss. 1court
[1969], Art.
12 such overly broad standOne
can agreeVol.
with
that

ards do give a board a great deal of discretionary control over
theater operators. However, among the standards which the
court found overly broad was the standard that the applicant
have "good moral character," stating "[fJor example, the board
may consider that an applicant who has exhibited films offensive to the sensibilities of the board members does not have
."11 The court was concerned
'good moral character'.
that the board could use this standard and the others to
impose a censorship or previous restraint upon the exercise
of the applicant's First Amendment right to freedom of expression. "Good moral character," however, is the basic standard for testing the qualifications of applicants for a great
variety of occupations. For example, in California one who
wishes to practice cosmetology or barbering must have "good
moral character and temperate habits."12 Dentists, pharmacists, engineers, physicians, and attorneys must all possess
"good moral character. ,,13
To engage in an occupation or profession of one's choice
is a constitutional right. In Stewart v. County of San Mated 4
the court of appeal, first district, stated:
[W]e note first that it is firmly established that the
right of every person to engage in a legitimate employment, business or vocation is an individual freedom secured by the due process provision of the federal and
state Constitutions. 15
And in the recent case of Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners of the State Bar/ 6 the supreme court affirmed that
there is a constitutional right to practice law. 17 If "good moral
11. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr.
at 726, 441 P.2d at 286.
12. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
and 6545.

§§

7362.1

13. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1628,
Dentists; § 4089, Pharmacists; § 6751,
Engineering; § 2168, Physicians; and
§ 6060, Attorneys.
Funeral directors
and embalmers need only have good
character. See §§ 7619 and 7643.
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14. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1966).
15. 246 Cal. App.2d at 284-285, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 606.
16. 65 Cal.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228,
421 P.2d 76 (1966).
17. Concerning the part that "good
moral character" plays in admission to
the Bar see March v. Committee of Bar
Examiners, 67 Cal.2d 718, 63 Cal. Rptr.
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character" is a standard which can be used as a weapon
to deny the licensing of a theater, it would seem that it would
have the same inherent danger as a standard to judge qualifications of applicants for licenses to engage in any occupation
or profession.
The Right to Remain Silent and Freedom of Speech

A novel application of freedom of speech was asserted by
the petitioner in the case of Fallis v. Department of Motor
Vehicles. IS The case arose when the petitioner sought a
writ of mandamus to the Department of Motor Vehicles to set
aside its order suspending his driver's license and asserted,
among other things, that freedom of speech included a right
to remain silent. The Department of Motor Vehicles has
the power to suspend a driver's license for refusal to take a
chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of the licensee's blood, under section 13353 of the Vehicle Code. In
contesting the validity of the suspension of his license, the
licensee contended that requiring him to give an answer to
the request to take the test, such as saying "no," was a violation
of his right of freedom of speech because that right includes
a right not to communicate at all. 19
The court answered that "it may be argued that freedom
of speech implies the right not to speak under compulsion:
(a) not to be compelled to utter an opinion in a certain tenor,
but also (b) not to be compelled to make any utterance of
any kind.,,20 It found some support for the first proposition
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette l but
could find none for the second proposition and thus concluded
399, 433 P.2d 191 (1967) and Hallinan
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65
Cal.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d
76 (1966).
18. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
595 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, in this volume.
19. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977,84 S.Ct. 1758
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(1964) wherein the Supreme Court declared that there is an absolute right
to remain silent based upon the privilege against self-incrimination of the
Fifth Amendment. This, of course, relates to criminal matters.
20. 264 Cal. App.2d at - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 600.
1. 319 U.S. 624, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 63
S.Ct. 1178, 147 A.L.R. 674 (1943).
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that there was no First Amendment violation in the enforcement of Section 13353.
Public Employment and Constitutional Rights

Public employment versus the exercise of one's right to
freedom of religion became the basis of the case of Hollon v.
Pierce. 2 Hollon was a school bus driver. Just before his
annual contract was to be renewed the district trustees were
informed that he was a sponsor of a religious tract containing
unorthodox religious views and violent denunciations of certain Christian denominations. The authorities became concerned about Hollon's emotional stability and fitness to drive
a school bus. In reviewing his file it was found to contain
some references to emotional outbursts over the happening
of certain events which he disliked. After Hollon refused an
offer to appear before them, and after considering the finding
of two psychiatrists that he was not maladjusted, disoriented,
psychotic or dangerous, the trustees refused to renew his contract.
The court of appeal, third district, in sustaining a superior
court denial of reinstatement, found that the trustees had acted
in good faith in not renewing Hollon's contract because of
their determination that he did not have the emotional stability
required of a school bus driver:
Irrationality takes many outward forms. Mental aberrations just as readily assume a religious guise as not.
That an aberration is expressed in religious terms does
not foreclose good faith inquiry into the aberration itself.
Such an inquiry by those responsible for the employee's
fitness is not an invasion of his private religious beliefs. 3
This case appears to be in accordance with Supreme Court
doctrine in matters involving the relationship between the
government and its employees where the question of fitness
is concerned.
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr.
808 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, in this volume.
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3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 477, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 814.
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In Shelton v. Tucker 4 the court held that a state certainly
had a right to investigate the competence and fitness of those
it employs as teachers. The same, of course, should apply
to any other public employee.
Although the court of appeal cites with approval the case
of Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,5 wherein
the supreme court enunciated a test to be used in judging
governmental restrictions on its employees in the exercise of
their constitutional rights, the Hollon case is not in the same
class. In this latter case the basic issue was whether the
trustees acted within the concept of due process in determining
Hollon's fitness to continue as a school bus driver. The Bagley
standard does not really fit this kind of an inquiry. The Bagley standard is more applicable to a situation where the
employee desires to exercise a constitutional right and the
government concludes that the public interest requires the
subordination of that right. s
Fitness for public employment and the exercise of a constitutional right were also before the court of appeal, first
district, in the case of Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles
Civil Service Commission. 7 In that case the petitioner in
applying for county employment stated that if he were ever
called before the House Un-American Activities Committee
he would refuse, on advice of counsel and on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer questions concerning so-called subversive activities of the kind required to be answered by Section 1028.1 of the California Government Code. He did agree
to answer questions before any other U. S. Congressional Committee or before the county, or any state, employing agency.s
On the basis of the information supplied by the petitioner
4. 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 81
S.Ct. 247 (1960).
5. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401,
421 P.2d 409 (1966).
6. For an exhaustive discussion of
Bagley v. Washington Township see
Cal Law Trends and Developments
1967, Constitutional Law.

7. 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 759 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, in this volume.
S. Petitioner was a former employee
of Los Angeles County but had been
discharged in 1957 because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
before HUAC the year before.
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

283

29

Constitutional Law

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 12

and without any type of a hearing on the issue, the county
refused to place his name on the eligibility list. He then
sought a writ of mandate, to compel the county to place him
on the eligibility list.
In affirming the decision of the superior court which granted
the writ of mandate, the court reviewed the course which the
Supreme Court cases have taken since the early 1950's. Two
concepts run through these cases. In a number of cases the
court has upheld the right of the government to make inquiry
into the loyalty of its employees, concluding that the failure
of the employee to supply such information relates to his fitness and reliability.9 The court has also held, however, that
an employee cannot be discharged just because he invokes the
privilege against self-incrimination.lO If the employee is to
be discharged following the taking of the privilege it must
be for reasons other than his invoking the privilege. The
reasons must relate to his fitness and must be determined by
holding a hearing on the matter.
The instant case does not fall within either of these concepts. In this case, while the petitioner has indicated he
will refuse to answer certain questions if ever again called
before HUAC, he has volunteered to answer any and all questions put to him by any other county or state agency. The
court stated: "All information relevant to loyalty and subversive activities, bearing on Hofberg's fitness as a county
employee, can be obtained by the Commission's merely asking
responden t. ,m
Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection Claimed, But Not Sustained

Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court wrote
in Railway Express Agency v. New York, "While claims
of denial of equal protection are frequently asserted, they are
9. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357
U.S. 399, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414, 78 S.Ct. 1317
(1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468,
2 L.Ed.2d 1423, 78 S.Ct. 1311 (1958).
10. Slochower v. Board of Higher
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Education, 350 U.S. 551, 100 L.Ed.
692, 76 S.Ct. 637 (1956).
11. 258 Cal. App.2d at 441, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 765.
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rarely sustained."12 This statement applies to the sixteen
cases in which the equal protection issue was raised in the
appellate courts in California this past year.' In none of
these cases was the appeal to this part of the Fourteenth Amendment successful. What makes the invocation
of this constitutional right generally unsuccessful is the criteria
by which alleged unequal treatment is judged:
In . . . cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there
is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and
has deferred to the wisdom of state legislatures. IS
This almost total submission to the wisdom of the legislature
lends weight to another statement Justice Jackson made in
Railway Express Agency:
The equal protection clause ceases to assure either equality or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable
difference that can be pointed out between those bound
and those left free. 14
A review of just a few of the cases will illustrate the application of the equal protection clause by the California appel·
late courts this past year.
Different tax treatment with regard to income earned in a
foreign country as compared to income earned in another state
was approved in Tetreault v. Franchise Tax Board. 15 In this
case the taxpayer earned income in Japan which was subject
to income tax there. The Franchise Tax Board disallowed the
tax paid to Japan in computing the taxpayer's California
income tax. In answer to the taxpayer's argument that this
denied him equal protection, the court quoted from the case
of Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers/6 to the effect that
while the equal protection clause does apply to state taxation,
12. 336 U.S. 106, 111,93 L.Ed. 533,
539, 69 S.Ct. 463 (1949).
13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
at 9, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 at 1016, 87 S.Ct.
1817 at 1822 (1967).
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14. 336 U.S. at 115, 93 L.Ed. at 541,
69 S.Ct. at 468.
15. 255 Cal. App.2d 277, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 326 (1967).
16. 358 U.S. 522, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 79
S.Ct. 437 (1959).
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there is no iron rule of equality and the states therefore have
broad power to fashion their tax schemes.
The California judicial system came under an equal protection attack in Whittaker v. Superior Court.I7 The issue before
the court was whether there was a denial of equal protection
in the state appellate procedure whereby in some counties
an appeal from a justice court was heard by a single judge
of the superior court, whereas in other counties such an appeal
would be heard by a three-judge panel of the superior court.
Section 77 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an
appellate department of the superior court only in counties
having municipal courts. The court of appeal, third district,
had concluded that Section 77 was a violation of the equal
protection clause and therefore void. Because of the impact
this would have had upon the appellate system, the Supreme
Court, on its own motion, had the matter transferred to it
for final decision.
After reviewing the judicial system in California and noting
that the appellate procedures are significantly different in
various geographical areas of the state, the court held that
such differences are founded upon a reasonable classification
by the legislature and thus do not offend the Fourteenth
Amendment. The test used was the one enunciated by the
Supreme Court, as set forth above: Does the classification
here in question bear a substantial and reasonable relationship
to a legitimate legislative objective?
Answering the question in the affirmative, the court noted
that while the existence of an appellate department of a superior court is determined by the existence of a municipal court
in the county, the determination is based on population and
geography and such classification is rational because rural
counties produce relatively few appeals and the cost of a multiple-judge court in those counties would be substantial.
The validity of a classification after the fact was the issue
before the Supreme Court in the case of City of Los Angeles
v. Standard Oil Co. of California. Is
17. 68 Cal.2d 357, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710,
438 P.2d 358 (1968).
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had broken
because of oil drilling operations
near it, the state legislature enacted a statute which changed
the law with regard to contribution among tortfeasors so that
it did not apply to the liability growing out of the bursting
of the dam. Under Section 875 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the right of contribution does not arise until one tortfeasor has paid the judgment. The new law, designated AB9,
gives rise to contribution among tortfeasors "when one tortfeasor has discharged by payment the common liability . . .
although judgment has not been rendered against all or any
of them in an action on the tort."19
In replying to the contention that AB9 violates constitutional guarantees against special and arbitrary legislation, the
court relied upon the usual test that the legislature has wide
discretion in making classifications and that such classifications
will not be struck down unless arbitrary or unreasonable. In
this case the court found that the need to get relief to the
injured property owners as soon as possible justified the legislature in changing the law to meet this urgent situation.
A female holding an on-sale liquor license and the wife
of any male holder of such a license may act as a barmaid but
other females may not under Section 25656 of the Business and
Professions Code. This classification was upheld in Hargens
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board. 20
Forbidding some female employees to mix drinks while
others are permitted to do so is a reasonable legislative classification, the court held, and therefore does not violate the
equal protection clause. The court believed that because the
state could control two of the classifications, that is, female
holders of licenses and wives of holders of licenses, by its
power to suspend the license, the state could then control
improper conduct by such females. The state, however, would
not have such control over a female who was merely an employee. This made the classification a reasonable one.
19. 262 Cal. App.2d at 122, 68 Cal.
Rptr. at 514.

20. 263 Cal. App.2d 601, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (1968).
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Congressional Redistricting Approved

In Silver v. Reagan! the California Supreme Court refused
to defer redistricting of the state's Congressional districts
until after the 1970 census. The court was of the opinion
that even though there had been a substantial increase in
population since the 1960 census, reapportionment at this
time would be less inequitable than allowing the then existing
inequitable districts to remain for another two years.
The court gave the legislature until November 10, 1967,
to submit to it a redistricting plan with the proviso that if the
legislature did not do so the court would order into effect a
plan the court deemed appropriate. The legislature did redistrict and what is now Section 30000 of the Elections Code
was submitted to the court and approved by it in Silver v.
Reagan. 2 This redistricting was then used as a basis for the
primary and general elections of 1968.
Due Process and the Wearing of a Beard

In 1966 the Supreme Court of California, in Bagley v.
Washington Township Hospital District,3 set forth a threepart test to be used by the court to test governmental restriction
upon the exercise of constitutional rights. In commenting
upon the Bagley standard this writer stated:
The standard adopted in Bagley appears to be a workable formula. Any such standard should weigh heavily
in favor of the individual, and his rights should be considered absolute insofar as possible to do SO.4
The case of Akin v. Riverside Unified School District Board
of Education 5 is another illustration of the application of the
Bagley test. That case involved the question of the suspension
of a high school student for wearing a beard in violation of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/12

_1. 67 Cal.2d 452, 62 Cal. Rptr. 424,
432 P.2d 26 (1967).

4. See Cal Law Trends and Develop!nellis 1967, page 341.

2. 67 Cal.2d 924, 64 Cal. Rptr. 325,
434 P.2d 621 (1967).
3. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401,
421 P.2d 409 (1966).
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557 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see McKinstry, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this volume.
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the school's "good grooming policy." Starting from a position
that the student had a constitutional right to wear a beard,
the court applied the Bagley standard and inquired:
(1) (W) hether the restraint imposed on the male stu-

dents' freedom to grow a beard, . . . rationally and
reasonably relates to the enhancement of a free public
education; (2) whether the benefits which the public
gains by the restraint prohibiting a beard outweigh the
resulting impairment of the students' right to grow a
beard; and (3) whether any alternative less subversive
of the students' constitutional right is available. 6
The court then reviewed the record and concluded that there
was evidence that wearing beards by students was disruptive;
that there was a benefit to the public to have the schools
operate with a minimum of interruption; and that there appeared to be no alternative less subversive to the student's
right to grow a beard.
The burden was upon the school board to meet the standard
to the satisfaction of the court. Only by meeting the standard
could the school restrict the student's constitutional right. In
this case the student also argued that "[t]he board's ruling
has the effect of extending into petitioner's home life thereby
violating his right of privacy."7 The court resolved this
question by quoting from Leonard v. School Committee of
Attlebor0 8 in which the Massachusetts court apparently merely
balanced the right against the interest of the other students,
the teachers, and the public and concluded that the latter's
interests were superior. The Bagley standard would appear to
be applicable to the constitutional right of privacy as well as
to the constitutional right of liberty of which wearing a beard
is part, and would give greater protection to that right than
a mere balancing test.
6. 262 Cal. App.2d at 167-168, 68
Cal. Rptr. at 562. (This is the Bagley
standard worded to reflect the precise
questions at issue.)
19
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Rptr. at 563.
8. 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468,
14 A.L.R.3d 1192 (1965).
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Due Process: Suspend License First-Listen Later
A compelling public interest supported the summary suspension of a license to operate a school for training guide
dogs for the blind in Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of
Guide Dogs.9 The constitutionality of Section 7214 of the
Business and Professions Code, which requires automatic suspension of a school's license if there is no licensed trainer
in charge, was attacked in this case as violating due process
because it contained no provisions for a hearing.
Adopting most of the opinion of the court of appeal, second
district, the supreme court sustained the statutory procedure.
The opinion recognized that the general rule in California is
that in the absence of a statute declaring otherwise, statutes
ought to be construed to require a hearing before suspension of
a license. Where there is a compelling public interest, however,
summary suspension with "judicial review" thereafter does not
violate due process. 10 Section 7214, however, does not provide for either a hearing or "judicial review." Judicial review
is available by resort to the statutory writ of mandate or by
way of a petition for declaratory relief. It was this latter
method that petitioner used in Eye Dog Foundation. It is
apparent that the judicial review referred to here would be in
the nature of a hearing during which a licensee would be permitted to present evidence why his license should not have
been suspended. Both the writ of mandate and the action
for declaratory relief in California give the licensee a trial
upon c'ontroverted issues of fact and thus fulfill due process
requirements. l l
The constitutionality of the hearing procedures under California's "implied consent" law, Section 13353 of the Vehicle
Code, was before the court in August v. Department of Motor
Vehicles. 12 This statute requires the Department of Motor
9. 67 Cal.2d 536, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21,
432 P.2d 717 (1967).

§

10. Escobedo v. State of California,
35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
11. See 32 Cal. Jur.2d MANDAMUS

12. 264 Cal. App.2d 52, 70 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, in this volume.
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Vehicles to suspend the driver's license of one who has refused
to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content
of his blood. But the procedure provides for notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the suspension becomes
effective. If the licensee does not request a formal hearing,
he will be given an informal one. 13 There are no detailed requirements as to how an informal hearing must be conducted.
The licensee is given an opportunity to attend, and to present
and controvert evidence. The statute, however, does not require that the arresting officer testify in person or be subjected to cross examination. In the instant case the licensee
attended the informal hearing, without counsel, and made
no objection to the use of the arresting officer's written statements and reports. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the license be suspended, though
the court which had accepted the licensee's plea of guilty to
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor had recommended that the license not be suspended because the licensee's
employment made it necessary for him to drive.
The court held that the statutory procedure did not violate due process. It recognized that due process did require
a hearing at some time either before or after suspension and
that one ought to have an opportunity to know all of the information being used against him and an opportunity to cross
examine. This applies, the court stated, where there are disputed questions of fact. In this case the licensee did not object
to the information use by the hearing officer, therefore there
were no disputed questions of fact. The court implied that
had the licensee objected to the written evidence, it would
have been necessary to have the arresting officer present and
to afford the licensee an opportunity to cross examine him.
This case follows the procedure outlined in previous cases
which require a hearing at some point before final suspension
of a driver's license. Although the licensee bears some burden
with regard to the extent of the hearing he receives, it is
apparent that if he objects to the use of the written statements
13. Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 14100 and
14104.
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of the officer, such statements cannot be used alone without an
opportunity for confrontation.
State Cannot Make a Man an Outcast in His Own Profession Without a Hearing

The case of Endler v. SchutzbanP4 presented the California
Supreme Court with this unusual due process question: Is an
individual entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
by a governmental agency which has taken no action against
him, but, based on unproved accusations, threatens disciplinary action against third parties who employ him?
The Commissioner of Corporations notified the plaintiff's
employer that he had information that charged the plaintiff
with forgery and embezzlement and that unless the employer
discharged the plaintiff, the commissioner would take steps
to suspend the license of the employer as a personal property
broker. Ultimately the employer acquiesced and discharged
plaintiff. The commissioner offered to conduct an informal
hearing into the alleged charges but retained the right to
threaten disciplinary action against any licensee who employed the plaintiff. Plaintiff refused to submit to such a
hearing. Thereafter the commissioner, according to the plaintiff, "embarked upon a policy of 'directing its licensees . . .
not to employ plaintiff on threat of revocation or suspension of
their personal property broker's license.' "15
Having found that it was virtually impossible to secure
employment in California under these circumstances, plaintiff
sought relief in the courts. The superior court dismissed the
action but on appeal the supreme court reversed, concluding
that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing and unless given
one by the commissioner, he was entitled to a declaration that
the commissioner had acted arbitrarily and should be en14. 68 Cal.2d 162, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297,
436 P.2d 297 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Collings,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this
volume.
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15. 68 Cal.2d at 167, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 301, 436 P.2d at 301.
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joined from further threatening licensees who desire to hire the
plaintiff.
Once it is accepted that plaintiff has an interest deserving
of constitutional protection, the conclusion reached by the
court is in accordance with due process standards. In
this instance the interest of the plaintiff is to be able to follow
any occupation he chooses. That interest cannot be destroyed without complying with the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The court made a distinction between the Supreme Court
cases of Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy16 and
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness 17 by pointing
out that in the former the government was regulating its own
internal operations (the individual involved was working in
a government arsenal), while in the latter the state was withholding a license to practice law.
The government can demand more from its employees, the
court implied, than from one who is seeking to follow a
chosen trade or profession. If by this the court meant that
the government as an employer may take good faith action,
unencumbered by constitutional restrictions, against an employee based solely upon his fitness to perform his duties, the
court would appear to be correct.
Endler, however, is more like Willner, and therefore "the
state may not make a man an outcast in his own profession
without affording him a full opportunity to present his defense. "18 Because the commissioner was not taking direct
action against the plaintiff, the question of his standing to
raise the issues was before the court. After reviewing a
number of Supreme Court cases relating to standing, the court
held that these cases
Coupled with the holding of Willner, . . . establish
the principle that any person whose freedom to pursue
his profession is seriously restricted by an official action
16. 367 U.S. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 81
S.Ct. 1743 (1961).

18. 68 Ca1.2d at 173, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 304, 436 P.2d at 304.

17. 373 U.S. 96, 10 L.Ed.2d 224, 83
S.C!. 1175, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963).
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or course of conduct designed to discourage his employment may compel the government to afford him a hearing
complying with the traditional requirements of due
process. 19

Justice Friedman in Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare
of State 20 characterized one of the issues as a "tug of war
. between the employers' insistence upon a 'trial type'
hearing featured by opportunities for confrontation, crossexamination and rebuttal, and the commission's pursuit of a
quasi-legislative or 'argument type' hearing. "1
In this case the State Industrial Welfare Commission, after
holding public meetings, issued certain orders relating to
wages, hours, and working conditions for women and minors
in industries handling products after harvest. During these
hearings interested persons were allowed to appear and testify.
In addition letters, statements, position papers, etc., were received by the commission. Witnesses were given a limited
time to testify, but no cross-examination or rebuttal were permitted.
In reaching its conclusion that the manner in which the
hearings were conducted did not offend due process, the
court stated that there was a distinction between adjudicative
hearings and legislative hearings. Due process does require
access to evidence and an opportunity for cross-examination
and rebuttal in the former but not in the latter. In the instant case the process before the commission was "quasilegislative" and because so related to the legislative process,
the restrictive procedures with regard to gathering of information upon which to base its order were permissible.
In a footnote to this decision 2 the court noted that Professor
Davis in his treatise on administrative law,3 prefers an ap-
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19. 68 Cal.2d at 178, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 308, 436 P.2d at 308.
20. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr.
739 (1968).
1. 265 Cal. App.2d at - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 748.
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proach that would determine the requirements of the hearing
upon resolving the question of whether the facts to be found
were adjudicative or legislative. Whether one uses the court's
approach, i.e., characterizing the proceedings as either legislative or adjudicative, or that of Professor Davis, the result
reached in the instant case would be the same, that the statutory procedure was not constitutionally defective. The
information being sought by the Commission here and the
function it was performing were of the kind that was a prelude
to the issuance of a general order respecting wages and hours.
This was the kind of order that the legislature could have
issued by the enactment of a statute without complying with
due process requirements of notice and hearing.
Eminent Domain Versus the Police Power

"Courts do not lightly interfere with public agencies to
whom regulatory police powers have been conferred. It is
our obligation to do so, however, when unreasonable or arbitrary action becomes manifest." This statement was taken
from Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing v. County of
San Joaquin. 4 It indicates that all is not lost for the citizen
when the government seeks to exercise its almost all-powerful
police power. What is even more encouraging is that the court
which made that statement followed it by concrete action in
ordering the issuance of a use permit unencumbered by conditions the court held to be invalid.
When petitioner sought a use permit from the county to
enlarge its cabinet shop, the county tacked on several conditions relating to the conveyance to the county of certain
adjoining lands without compensation for eventual use in
constructing an expressway. Recognizing that the government could not function effectively if every diminution in
value of property were compensable, the court nevertheless
4. 257 Cal. App.2d 181 at 191, 65
Cal. Rptr. 37 at 43-44 (1967). For
further discussion of this case, see

Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, in this
volume.
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found that in this case the county "was attempting to avoid the
constitutional guarantee of payment of just compensation via
the method of exacting 'conditions' to the granting of a use
permit arbitrarily inspired and that in doing so it had exceeded
its powers.,,5
5. 257 Cal. App.2d at 189, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 42.
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